It is well to collect cogent proofs of frequentism’s failings so that supporters of that theory can look upon them and find joy. Alan Hájek has done yeoman service in this regard […]
Scrap Statistics, Begin Anew
You or I might perhaps be excused if we sometimes toyed with solipsism, especially when we reflect on the utter failure of our writings to produce the smallest effect in the alleged […]
Bayes Is More Than Probably Right: An Answer To Senn; Part I
Stephen Senn very kindly answered a post I wrote on p-values (Unsignificant Statistics: Or Die P-Value, Die Die Die) by sending me his “You May Believe You Are a Bayesian But You […]
All Probability Is Conditional: An Answer To Senn; Part IV
Read Part III. Still with me? Hope so, because we’re only on the second page of Senn’s article (but don’t fret; we’ll be skipping most of it). Review: in logical-probability Bayes (as […]
On The Probability God Exists
In order not to make the reader sick with jealously, I will not tell him that I sit on the porch on a bright summer morning mere steps away from Lake Michigan—where […]
What Should Philosophers Of Statistics Do?
A while back, far longer than it should have been, D.G. Mayo asked me to stop by her place and comment on a couple of posts. But laziness and excessive travel (primarily […]
Subjective Versus Objective Bayes (Versus Frequentism): Part I
Definitions We first have to define what subjectivity and objectivity are and from these see what happens. For those unused to reading long stretches of prose, here is the conclusion, which will […]
The Jeffreys-Lindley Paradox Isn’t
Background A paradox is a mistake in thinking; an artificial, human creation which usually arises because a conclusion which follows from a set of beloved premises is itself unloved. Twitter user @alpheccar […]
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