On The Probability Of God

Every so often people return to the “probability of God.” Here are three men doing that. They worry about “priors” and “posteriors” and all the heavy apparatus of probability theory (which I teach you in Class). I could have saved them the trouble.

Speaking of the probability of God is like speaking of the probability of you, in what might seem an odd way. Ask yourself, “What is the probability of me?” That is, that you exist. And you must answer “1”. It does not seem an interesting question, or result. But it is. Before we get to questions about God, let’s see first why this is.

There is no probability of God unconditional of any evidence, but there can be the probability of the proposition “God exists” given certain specific evidence you consider or accept, where part of that evidence includes just what you mean by “God” and “exists”. That is key. No probability is defined without reference to something, including the definitions and meaning of all terms and evidence used.

The question about you is the same. For you, the answer was 1, because the definition of “you” to you is you, Conditional on “you” being you, the chance you exist is certain, i.e. 1. But for me it is different, because for me the definition of “you” is not the same. You know who you are: I don’t. For me, it depends on what I mean by “you”. If “you” means “some reader”, then given my observations that posts get some readers, the probability “you” exist is also 1 for me.

But if “you” means some specific individual of whom I had never heard, say Richard Hudnut, then the probability is not 1. Indeed, it is incalculable, because I don’t have enough information. Best I can say, given this definition of “you”, is that since the name is not impossible, this “you” might exist, which means “you” are not impossible (probability of 0) or necessary (probability of 1). And that is all I can do.

Definitions matter! Both sides of the probability equation, the proposition of interest and the evidence assumed, are equally important.

Now to the probability of “God exists”. It depends, again, on what you mean by “God” and “exist”. And then it depends, just as much, on what evidence you assume.

One of the three men in the video did it the right way. I think he came to the wrong answer, but he understood that metaphysical arguments were needed. He began with defining, as he must, “God”. He said a being who is “omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent”, the a “necessary” being. Which is well enough, but each of these words are heavy in meaning themselves.

Take “omnipotence.” The man trotted out a hoary old argument: “‘Can [God] make a stone so heavy he can’t lift it?’ This suggests that omnipotence is impossible.” To him, “omnipotence” means “ability to do anything“. Given that definition, the probability “An omnipotent God exist” must be 0, because God cannot do everything.

But that is a screwy definition of “omnipotence.” Another, and the one I share, is “can do anything possible“. Creating stones too heavy to lift is an impossibility. It is like creating the number 2 equal to 3, or fashioning a married bachelor. It is like you saying “I cannot speak any words.” Even God cannot do the impossible. That means, with this definition, the man’s argument carries no weight. (Good pun!)

Next is “omniscient”. His take: “If you know everything you’re ever going to do, then you’re not free to do anything else. Therefore, an omniscient being cannot have free will. But if God lacks free will, then perhaps he is not very powerful at all.”

This is similar to the mistake of thinking things have probabilities. That you know you will choose chocolate over vanilla does not mean you did not choose chocolate. Knowledge of what has happened or will happen does not, in any way, imply that knowledge caused what has or will happen. Me knowing the sun will rise in the east is not making the sun rise in the east. I am pretty powerful, it’s true, but even I have limitations.

His definition of “omniscience” is something like “all knowing and all causing”, whereas mine is simply “all knowing.” Again, his argument gives no insight. (Not as good a pun.)

Closest he comes to a definition of “omnibenevolent” is this: “Maybe omnipotence and moral perfection are incompatible because there is no best possible world (only a series of better and better possible worlds), yet a morally perfect being must always do the best thing that it can do.”

This makes no sense to me, but perhaps it does to you. Whatever meaning it might have, it at least has the implicit assumption that morality exists. And if that is so, so does God (omnibevolence).

You may have heard of “The Problem of Evil”. It’s always (so far as I’ve seen) stated incorrectly. The real problem of evil is that, without an ultimate moral yardstick, there is no such thing as evil. There is only your opinion, or rather feeling, and that is of no value whatsoever. None. Nada. I’ll have more to say on this later.

Now we can go on and on like this, investigating all manner of arguments for and against certain metaphysical propositions, and there is much profit in this. But I trust we have made the point that in considering this, or any, question of probability, one has to be as clear as possible about both sides of the equation: about what the proposition considered means, and on what evidence supports or negates it. We focus often, and too much, on the evidence, forgetting that it is only half the work.

One last proof of that, from our man: “Some theists say that God is by definition a ‘necessary being,’ one who could not have failed to exist. But the idea of a person who could not have failed to exist is obviously nonsensical. (We should probably just avoid this definition.)”

His definition of “necessary being” is evidently something like an ordinary person; though even that is far from clear. He has not been careful here. What some mean by “necessary”, and I am with them, is a being which if He did not exist, nothing could exist.

As briefly as I can make it: there has to be a reason, i.e. a cause, for why things are the way they are. All things. If you point to simpler “laws” (which I don’t accept) to explain some things, then you still have to explain why the “laws” are the way they are. You can continue and say there are even more basic reasons why the “laws” are like they are, but then you have to explain those more basic reasons. This cannot continue indefinitely; there must come one singular cause at base for why all things are like they are, and that reason we call God.

Since this is the internet, I’m bound to say that I have not here today tried to provide convincing proofs of God’s existence. Complaining of that lack, therefore, is pushing on an open door. I have shown you that probability is rarely as simple as you think.

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